National Security and The Media 

The National Security Council (NSC) is a cabinet committee in the UK Government that serves as the main forum for collective discussion on national security, defence, foreign policy, development, and international relations.[1] The rise of the media has influenced public engagement with national security matters. Easier access to technology enables millions of people across the UK to engage with the government, facilitating effective communication between citizens and their representatives. This allows the public to participate in the process of security decision-making and helps increase participants' awareness.

Over the last 30 years, UK intelligence agencies have transformed into a more public-facing role, resulting in an increase in governments explaining what they do directly to the public. As a result, government agencies have developed a media presence and communicate directly to the public, engaging in social media posts, public statements, and the use of media channels. For example, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) joined Twitter in 2016, Instagram in 2018, as the director of communications wanted to be ‘more accessible’ to help the public understand the work they do.[2] Furthermore, MI5 joined Instagram in 2021, increasing their presence on social media websites.[3] The coverage of security-related and political issues helps to shape public opinions, with citizens being able to share information in real time, which produces a reliance on media outlets for details on ongoing situations. Individuals can be critical of media reports and question the integrity of data. However, they are key to setting agendas and pushing specific narratives. The media and government agencies have a long and troubled relationship, with the latter dealing with secretive information and the former trying to reveal it. This article explores this complex relationship and examines how the media can serve as a positive influence in shaping public opinion, especially on issues related to national security.

Information Dissemination 

Information Dissemination is the systemic process of sharing information, data, and knowledge with a targeted audience. In politics, this can be done through various channels such as speeches, media channels, and social media.[4] Historically, in times of crisis, governments would seize control over media outlets to manage public perceptions and maintain national stability.[5] The rise of news channels on radio and television exacerbated this, with state broadcasting being used as a propaganda tool. In recent years, the increase in social media usage has allowed for information to be spread far and quickly. The UK government has distinguished between misinformation and disinformation. The former is defined as the inadvertent spread of false information, while the latter is the deliberate creation and dissemination of fake and/or manipulated information intended to deceive and mislead individuals for personal, financial, or political gain.[6] 

The Oxford Internet Institute (2020) survey focused on the use of disinformation across the globe. It found evidence of social media being used to spread computational propaganda and disinformation about politics. It found that government agencies in 62 countries had used disinformation tactics to shape public attitudes.[7] This demonstrates the prevalence of using media channels to target specific audiences to direct public opinion. This can be done using automated bot accounts and ‘human curated’ accounts. Automated accounts, sometimes referred to as ‘political bots’, are used to amplify specific narratives by spamming networks with content designed to drown other narratives out.[8] The ‘human-curated’ accounts are becoming increasingly popular among government officials, with them conversing with the public or posting on social media to appear more ‘normal.’

Social media plays a vital role in contemporary society, especially for government officials or activist groups to reach targeted audiences. Research carried out by Ipsos, in partnership with JOE media, found that social media is the dominant way that young Britons aged 16-34 receive their information about current events. This research found that 56% of young men and 60% of young women in this age range use social media as their main source of information.[9] This indicates that over half of the young population turns to social media to keep updated on current affairs, highlighting the trust in digital platforms. However, it must be noted that this is not specific to political news, and the survey revealed high concerns over misinformation being shared, with 79% expressing this as a worry. Although trust in social media content is becoming more popular among younger generations, traditional news sources still score higher in trust. The BBC is regarded as the most trustworthy source in the UK for young people to stay up to date with recent events.[10] Identifying mis/disinformation is a real challenge for individuals using traditional media and social media. False and misleading information is an ongoing phenomenon in times of crisis. It can lead to citizens losing trust in news from media channels and social media, which in turn creates distrust in the state.[11] Information spreads widely and quickly, and viral content can trigger mass reactions. For example, false narratives have spread in the UK surrounding the Russia-Ukraine War, with state-sponsored campaigns targeting UK security systems. A reported £1 billion has been invested in ongoing disinformation campaigns aimed at diminishing Western support for Ukraine.[12] This indicates how these tactics are used to target specific audiences and manipulate public opinion, undermining trust between the public and governments. 

As a result of the spread of information online, Ofcom created the Online Safety Act 2023.[13] This Act aims to promote media literacy, tackle illegal activity, and address misinformation and disinformation. Ofcom has strong regulatory powers with the ability to investigate non-compliance, impose fines, and even apply to the courts to block services. This is a vital programme to tackle the spread of mis/disinformation in the UK,  as it can protect the public and create a new set of duties for media and social media channels. It is a great first step in the right direction; however, its enforcement tactics are weak. Many points of the Act remain ambiguous and centre around systems rather than individual content.[14] Additionally, this Act drew public backlash, with a petition garnering over 400,000 signatures due to concerns about censorship.[15]

Impact on Policy Decision Making

Whether individuals intentionally seek out or passively encounter political content through their feed, social media has become a primary news source for many young people. Many government agencies and officials have joined social media sites such as X and TikTok to promote their campaigns. During the 2024 UK general election, political parties posted numerous times per day to reach audiences, with Labour making a total of just under 1000 posts.[16] This demonstrates that social media is a prime tactic for reaching certain audiences, influencing the public to see that government officials share common interests, promoting their policies, and shaping voting behaviour. 

The media has both positive and negative implications on national security, as it can enhance public awareness and allow citizens to be involved in government initiatives.[17] On the other hand, sensationalised reporting can lead to the spread of misinformation, public panic, and exacerbate fragile situations. During the May 2024 UK general election, Labour’s security and defence policies focused on border control, aiming to secure and properly manage it, and reduce the number of immigrants. They claim in their manifesto that “the small boats crisis, fuelled by dangerous criminal smuggler gangs, is undermining our security and costing lives” and state this will be a priority matter.[18] Three months later, social media played a critical role in the spread of mis/disinformation surrounding the stabbing of three children. Social media posts claimed the perpetrator was a Muslim who had recently arrived illegally in the UK, leading to attacks on targets associated with Islam, such as a mosque.[19] This content included anti-muslim and anti-immigration posts being spread, even though the attacks were based on false reports. Traditional media channels joined in, with Channel 4 describing the perpetrator as an “African invader.”[20] As a result, riots erupted throughout the UK, with racist attacks, arson, and looting being carried out. Post-riots, Prime Minister Keir Starmer made a deal with France to reduce the number arriving illegally in the UK. Under the home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, new plans were outlined, including a change to the timeline for refugees. Currently, once granted status, people have this for five years before being able to apply for indefinite leave to remain, creating a path for citizenship. Under Mahmood’s plans, the wait will be twenty years, and they can be removed from the UK as soon as their home countries are deemed safe to return to.[21] This demonstrates that government policies can be impacted due to public opinions and the spread of mis/disinformation as these riots called for attention from the government to address the current system. 

Recommendations 

Overall, the role of the media in influencing policy-making decisions, particularly concerning national security is multifaceted. It is an important tool for the public to receive information in times of crisis. However, it can be an unreliable source due to the spread of mis/disinformation. A top priority should be ensuring that the media contributes positively to the spread of information and the policy-making process. Due to this, the following recommendations are presented:

1. Media literacy courses 

The Online Safety Act hopes to improve media literacy; however, it is important for government officials, educational institutions, and civil society to promote educational interventions that will develop skills in identifying and navigating false information online. This can include media and digital literacy programmes which supply the tools needed and highlight mis/disinformation examples. One key example of this is Learn to Discern – Media Literacy Training, which aims to assist individuals in thinking critically.[22] Programmes such as the Learn to are helpful in assessing current news events and allowing individuals to analyse the content they are viewing. These courses would be beneficial to the public, and collaboration between the Government, media channels, and educational institutions would allow individuals to access such courses and improve media literacy. 

2. Counter mis/disinformation Toolkits 

These toolkits can be targeted for specific audiences such as government officials, professionals and public sector workers. They are helpful campaigns that aim to tackle the spread of mis/disinformation and provide the tools for specific sectors to tackle the spread of these. For example, the Government Communication Service[23] have provided a toolkit to help resist and stop the spread of false news information. However, this is aimed at professionals rather than the public, keeping the knowledge and skills within a close circle. Also, the Local Government Association has developed guidelines to tackle the spread of mis/disinformation, which is aimed at anyone in society.[24] Providing toolkits similar to these to individuals or groups in society will allow people to recognise and limit the spread of fake news. Promoting these tools is just as important as making them available. Although the Local Government Association’s guide is intended for anyone, not many people will know about it unless it is actively advertised.

3. Introduce Platform Responsibility 

The Online Safety Act 2023 is an important initial tool in regulating media channels. However, this does have its limitations. The UK Government should introduce regulations that hold social media and traditional media channels responsible for labelling posts as potentially false information, and by removing the content from their channels. Interventions should include fact-checking and source-credibility labels to reduce the spread of false news. This will allow users to fact-check their information rather than continuing to spread it and creating false narratives, which in turn impact public opinions and policy-making decisions. This will help to improve accuracy, sharing intentions, and discernment. It requires collaboration between governments and advocates to pressure media channels to include warnings or reliable source labels. During COVID-19, many platforms like Facebook and YouTube implemented warning labels and linked to reputable sources.[25]

 References

[1] National Security Council. Gov.uk. Available:  https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/national-security-council#:~:text=The%20National%20Security%20Council%20(NSC,in%20the%20current%20financial%20climate [Accessed 23rd October 2025] 

[2] McLoughlin, L., Ward, S., & Lomas, D. W. B. (2020). ‘Hello, world’: GCHQ, Twitter and social media engagement. Intelligence and National Security, 35(2), 233–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1713434

[3] MI5 Security Services. (2021). MI5 Joins Instagram. Available: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/mi5-joins-instagram. [Accessed 25th October 2025] 

[4] International Initiative for Impact Evaluation. (2022) Disseminating information through media for governance and electoral change: Evidence Gap Map Practitioner Brief. Available: https://3ieimpact.org/evidence-hub/publications/evidence-gap-map/disseminating-information-through-media-governance-and [Accessed 27th October 2025]

[5] Welch, D. (2021). A Guide to Government Information and Propaganda 1939-2009. British Online Archives. Available: https://britishonlinearchives.com/collections/100/contextual-essays/421/a-guide-to-british-government-information-and-propaganda-1939-2009. [Accessed 27t October 2025] 

[6] Cabinet Office and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. (2023). Fact Sheet on the CDU and RRU. Gov.uk. Available: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/fact-sheet-on-the-cdu-and-rru [Accessed 28th October 2025] 

[7] Bailey, H., Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P.N. (2021). Industrialized Disinformation 2020 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. The Computational Propaganda Project, The University of Oxford. Available: https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2021/02/CyberTroop-Report20-Draft9.pdf [Accessed 30th October 2025] 

[8] Bailey, H., Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P.N. (2021). Industrialized Disinformation 2020 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. The Computational Propaganda Project, The University of Oxford. Available: https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/12/2021/02/CyberTroop-Report20-Draft9.pdf [Accessed 30th October 2025]

[9] Jones, R. (2025). Young Britons trust social media as a news source despite misinformation fears. Ipsos and JOE media. Available: https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/young-britons-trust-social-media-news-source-despite-misinformation-fears [Accessed 2nd November 2025] 

[10] Bitesize. (2025). Growing number of teens trust social media for news. Available: https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/articles/zyk8ywx [Accessed 24th November 2025]

[11] Pawelec, M. (2022). Deepfakes and Democracy (Theory): How Synthetic Audio-Visual Media for Disinformation and Hate Speech Threaten Core Democratic Functions. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44206-022-00010-6 [Accessed 5th November 2025] 

[12] Dixon, W. (2025). Why the UK Now Needs a National Disinformation Agency. Rusi. Available:    https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-uk-now-needs-national-disinformation-agency [Accessed 4th November] 

[13] Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. (2025). Online Safety Act Explainer. GOV.UK. Available: Online Safety Act: explainer - GOV.UK [Accessed 11th November 2025]

[14] A & L Goodbody. (2023). The Online Safety Act in Focus: Key challenges, implementation, and navigating Ofcom’s approach. Available: The_Online_Safety_Act_in_Focus.pdf [Accessed 12th November 2025]

[15] Carroll, M. (2025). Hundreds of thousands of people backlash against internet safety rules. Sky News. Available: Hundreds of thousands of people backlash against internet safety rules | Science, Climate & Tech News | Sky News [Accessed 12th November 2025]

[16] Fletcher, R. (2024).  Which social networks did political parties use most in 2024? UK Election Analysis. Available: https://www.electionanalysis.uk/uk-election-analysis-2024/section-6-the-digital-campaign/which-social-networks-did-political-parties-use-most-in-2024/ [Accessed 3rd November 2025] 

[17] Labour. (2024). Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024. Available: Change Labour Party Manifesto 2024 [Accessed 10th November 2025]. 

[18] Labour. Secure Borders. Available at: https://labour.org.uk/delivering/secure-borders/

[19] Venkataramakrishnan, S. (2025). From Disinformation to Violence: The UK Far Right and 2024 Riots. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 17(2), 8–15. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48815455

[20] Venkataramakrishnan, S. (2025). From Disinformation to Violence: The UK Far Right and 2024 Riots. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 17(2), 8–15. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48815455

[21] Ross, A. (2025). How Labour’s controversial immigration crackdown could make Britain among the toughest in Europe. Independent. Available:  How Labour’s controversial immigration crackdown could make Britain’s asylum rules among the toughest in Europe | The Independent. [Accessed 9th November 2025] 

[22] Johannson, P., Enock, F., Hale, S., Vidgen, B., Bereskin, C., Margetts, H & Bright, J. (2023). How can we combat online misinformation? A systematic overview of current interventions and their efficacy. The Alan Turing Institute: London. Available: tackling_online_misinformation_report_2023_v3.pdf. [Accessed 10th November 2025] 

[23] Engelson, H ., Fjällhed, A., Nothhaft, H.,  Pamment, J.,  Twetman & Rönngren, E. (2019).  RESIST Counter-Disinformation toolkit. Government Communication Service Available: RESIST Counter-disinformation Toolkit [Accessed 14th November 2025]

[24] Local Government Association. A Guide to disinformation affecting local authorities and their communities.  Available: https://www.local.gov.uk/guide-disinformation-affecting-local-authorities-and-their-communities#responding-to-disinformation [Accessed 27th November 2025]

[25] Warnke L, Maier A-L, Gilbert DU. (2024). Social media platforms’ responses to COVID-19-related mis- and disinformation: the insufficiency of self-governance. J Manage Gov. 28 pp.1079–115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-023-09694-5